Basic economics partitions goods into private goods and public goods, and property into private property and public property. Private goods are defined as those goods that are rival — one person’s consumption of the good reduces the amount available for others to consume — and excludable — a person can be prevented from consuming the good. Thus a cookie is a private good. A cookie eaten reduces the stock of cookies, and cookies can be locked up.
In contrast to private goods, public goods are non-rival and non-excludable. The services of a lighthouse is an example of a public good because one person’s use of the lighthouse signal does not affect the use of the signal by others, and people cannot be prevented from seeing the lighthouse signal. Continue reading “Goods, Property and Externalities”
Happy Holi. Among the dozens of Hindu festivals, holi and diwali are the most fun. Holi is also a wonderful Hindu export — like yoga, meditation, ayurveda, the Hindu number system.
The planet Mars is a very advanced planet: it’s entirely populated by robots. People haven’t set foot on Mars but that may change in the next 15 years or so.
The phrase “property rights” appears to refer to the rights of property. That of course is meaningless because property aren’t people, and therefore property cannot have rights. Property rights refers to the notion that humans have the right to their private property. Therefore to place property rights in some form of opposition to human rights — as I did in
Should society (through its institutions such as the government) defend property rights or human rights? That question is of course meaningless if one of the sets includes the other as a proper subset. But let’s assume for the moment that they are indeed distinct, and therefore the question makes sense.
How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous and humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it.